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About this Project: I work on various ways in which we change our beliefs, preferences, intentions, or other attitudes. Understanding change is notoriously difficult and neglected, despite being essential to any genuine science of human agents. Change can be more or less radical, more or less rational, and more or less under our conscious control. Classical choice theory attempts to reduce all change to Bayesian information learning. I go beyond this approach, which ignores phenomena such as fundamental belief or value revision, awareness growth, and formation (rather than updating) of attitudes.

Related Work:

The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: a general impossibility theorem (with C. List). In: I. Douven (ed.) Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief. Essays on the Lottery Paradox, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming

From degrees of belief to binary beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory (with C. List), Journal of Philosophy 115: 225-270, 2018 → Official Version

Savage's theorem under changing awareness, Journal of Economic Theory 176: 1-54, 2018 → Official Version

Introduction to the special issue 'Beliefs in Groups' of Theory and Decision (with W. Rabinowicz), Theory and Decision 85: 1-4, 2018 → Official Version

Belief revision generalized: a joint characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules (with C. List and R. Bradley), Journal of Economic Theory 162: 352-371, 2016 → Official Version

Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking, Journal of Theoretical Politics 26(3): 405-41, 2014 → Official Version

Where do preferences come from? (with C. List), International Journal of Game Theory 42(3): 613-637, 2013 → Official Version

Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework, Games and Economic Behavior 76: 471-94, 2012 → Official Version

A model of non-informational preference change (with C. List), Journal of Theoretical Politics 23(2): 145-64, 2011 → Official Version

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