Jury Theorems and Social Epistemology


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About this Project: Social epistemology often relies on jury theorems to defend the 'wisdom of crowds'. But the classic jury theorem, going back to Condorcet (1785), is limited in scope and misleading in its premises and conclusions. Often in collaboration with Christian List or Kai Spiekermann, I aim to extend and revise the picture by introducing improved jury theorems and studying their epistemological significance. Genuinely plausible jury theorems cannot reach the optimistic conclusion that 'huge' groups are virtually infallible in their majority judgments. By aiming for more plausible conclusions based on more plausible premises, we hope to rehabilitate the jury-theorem approach to social truth-tracking and to deliver convincing epistemic arguments for democratic decision-making.

Related Work:

Social Epistemology [a review] (with K. Spiekermann). In: M. Knauff & W. Spohn (eds.) The Handbook of Rationality, MIT Press, in press

Jury Theorems [a review] (with K. Spiekermann). In: M. Fricker et al. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2020

A theory of Bayesian groups, Noûs 53: 708-736, 2019 → Official Version

Introduction to the special issue 'Beliefs in Groups' of Theory and Decision (with W. Rabinowicz), Theory and Decision 85: 1-4, 2018 → Official Version

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth (with I. Bozbay and H. Peters), Games and Economic Behavior 87: 571-590, 2014 → Official Version

Independent opinions? On the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems (with K. Spiekermann), Mind 122(487): 655-685, 2013 → Official Version

Epistemic democracy with defensible premises (with K. Spiekermann), Economics and Philosophy 29(1): 87-120, 2013 → Official Version

The premises of Condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified, Episteme - a Journal of Social Epistemology 5(1): 56-73, 2008 → Official Version

General representation of epistemically optimal procedures, Social Choice and Welfare 26(2): 263-283, 2006 → Official Version

A model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence (with C. List), Synthese 142: 175-202, 2004 → Official Version

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