Normative Uncertainty

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About this Project: How should one evaluate options when one is uncertain about the correct standard of evaluation, perhaps due to conflicting normative intuitions? Such 'normative' uncertainty differs from ordinary 'empirical' uncertainty. While empirical uncertainty is at the heart of rational-choice theory, normative uncertainty has recently become prominent in philosophy. Jointly with Marc Fleurbaey and our student Brian Jabarian, I have begun to explore normative uncertainty from formal and philosophical perspectives. For instance, to what extent can standard choice-theoretic uncertainty (not) capture normative uncertainty? What decision rules are appropriate if we face normative as well as empirical uncertainty? A solid axiomatic approach will help, but the philosophical dimension should not get lost on the way.

Related Work:

Axiomatics of normative uncertainty (with B. Jabarian) [a preliminary version is available from the authors]

Expected value under normative uncertainty (with B. Jabarian)

The risk attitude under normative uncertainty (with B. Jabarian)

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