

# Corrigendum to ‘The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory’

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In this note, we correct an error in our statement of the condition of ‘implication preservation’, introduced in Section 3 and used in Theorem 1. Recall that in Section 3 attitudes are either probabilistic (with value set  $V = [0, 1]$ ) or binary (with value set  $V = \{0, 1\}$ ). Call an attitude function on the agenda  $X$  *compatible* with a given set  $S$  of propositions if that function can be extended to a probability or truth function that assigns the value 1 to each proposition in  $S$ . The correct statement of ‘implication preservation’ is the following:

**Implication preservation.** For all sets of implications of the form  $p \rightarrow q$ , where  $p, q \in X$ , and all admissible profiles, if all individuals’ attitude functions are compatible with this set of implications, then so is the collective attitude function generated by  $F$ .

This differs from what we stated in the paper by referring not to a single implication, but to a set of implications. We had originally introduced the condition of ‘implication preservation’ in relation to the aggregation of probability functions defined on  $\sigma$ -algebras (Dietrich and List 2007b, as cited in the paper), where the reference to a single implication is sufficient. The error arose when we translated the condition into the current framework, where attitude functions are defined, not on  $\sigma$ -algebras, but on potentially much smaller agendas. Here, the reference to a set of implications is needed.